4
Section 194 of the 2010 Act specifically facilitates an application by a member of a cohabiting couple for provision out of the net estate of his partner. The court can make the provision that it "considers appropriate having regard to the rights of any other person having an interest in the matter". 25 It must be satisfied that "proper provision in the circumstances" was not made for the applicant during the deceased's life. 26 This idea of "proper" provision somewhat begs the question, although the concept is nevertheless used in the context of marital breakdown. 27 The 2010 Act itself provides limited guidance as to its interpretation, stipulating that the reason for the lack of such proper provision, leading to a potential claim under section 194, can be anything except "conduct by the applicant" that the court considers it "unjust to disregard". 28 The Act could therefore retrospectively uphold a cohabitant's decision to punish his partner for undesirable conduct by refusing to make otherwise proper provision for him during their joint lives.
The focus on provision made for the applicant during the joint lives of the parties may imply no expectation that a cohabitant will make testamentary provision for his partner. At first glance, this contrasts with English Law's focus on whether reasonable provision was made by will or the intestacy rules. 29 That said, the Explanatory Memorandum for the original Irish Bill expressly assumed that testamentary provision would be included in the definition of "proper provision…during the lifetime of the deceased", 30 and any such provision is clearly a relevant factor.
31
When deciding whether to make an order, the court is instructed to consider all the circumstances of the case, 32 including any order that is available inter vivos already made in favour of the applicant, 33 any devise or bequest made to the applicant by the deceased (as noted above), the interests of the beneficiaries of the estate, 35 and the same factors considered on an application for the orders available inter vivos.
36
Only where the relationship ended before the death is an applicant for provision under section 194 required to demonstrate (prospective) financial dependence on the deceased. 37 The
Explanatory Memorandum for the original Bill suggests that only a dependent cohabitant could make a claim, 38 but the subsequent insertion of the subsection dealing with relationships ending before death confirms that a claim could be made in the absence of dependence in the case of a subsisting relationship. Indeed, the Law Reform Commission considered a test of economic dependency to be unnecessary in succession cases where the parties had not ended their relationship, precisely because it was still subsisting at the time of death and a succession-based remedy could be said to give effect to the presumed intention of the parties. 39 In any case, a court is more likely to conclude that "proper provision" was not made where there was dependence, and the degree of financial dependence is considered when deciding whether the couple satisfied the definition of "cohabitants" in the first place.
40
Section 194 is clearly affected by the constitutional protection afforded to marriage.
Provision made under it may not exceed the value of that to which the cohabitant would have been entitled had he been party to a marriage or civil partnership with the deceased. 41 Moreover, the provision cannot affect the legal right of any surviving spouse, 42 or the entitlements of spouses or civil partners under the Succession Act 1965. 43 Unfortunately, the nature of the provision that the court can order does not appear to be the subject of further definition in the Act.
In addition to the specific claim for provision out of an estate, it is expressly permissible to make one of the predominantly inter vivos orders introduced by the Act, the "compensatory maintenance order", 44 "during the lifetime of either of the cohabitants" 45 such that it may be relevant after the death of one party. Nevertheless, it seems that such orders are primarily intended for relationships ending otherwise than by death, since (for example) the court can preclude a future application for provision from an estate under section 194 when making one of the orders available inter vivos.
46
This is similar to the power possessed by English courts when disposing of applications for financial relief on divorce in relation to future applications for family provision.
47
The criteria for the orders available inter vivos, designed to provide a "safety-net system", 48 are that the "qualified cohabitant" is "financially dependent" on the other cohabitant as a result of the relationship or the ending thereof, and that the court considers it "just and equitable" in "all the circumstances" to make the order. 49 In deciding whether the "just and equitable" test is satisfied, the court is instructed to have regard to a number of factors contained in section 173(3). 50 These are the current and future "financial circumstances, needs and obligations" of the parties, the "rights and entitlements" of any current or former spouse or civil partner and of any dependent child or child from a previous relationship of the parties (given that that the court is not allowed to make an order that would affect "any right" of any person to whom the respondent is or was married: (2010 Act, section 173(5)), the relationship's duration, the basis on which it was entered and the degree of commitment involved in it, the past or likely future contribution made by each of the cohabitants to their collective or the other's welfare, including to the other's earning capacity, income or resources, their contributions "in looking after the home", the effect on their earning capacity of the division of responsibilities during their relationship, any disability suffered by the applicant, and the conduct of both parties if it is such that the court considers it "unjust" to disregard it. agreement may bar applications for inter vivos or succession-based provision under the Act, 52 subject to the courts' power to vary or set aside the agreement "in exceptional circumstances, where its enforceability would cause serious injustice".
53
The courts' approach to the available orders will doubtless provoke discussion, especially given the Act's complexity. The legislature was content to specify a wide range of factors but also to leave doubts about the meaning of some provisions. The concern of this article, however, is the definition of the "qualified cohabitant" for the purposes of succession law, and how it compares to its equivalent in English Law and to more inclusive provisions in Australia. The next section of the article outlines the English law of family provision as a precursor to that discussion. The "dependant" category nevertheless remains useful for those claimants who fail to satisfy the particular definition reserved for cohabiting couples in the Act, which is considered in Part III.
B. England and Wales
In Churchill v. Roach, for example, the applicant was unable to satisfy the minimum duration requirement in order to apply as a member of an eligible couple, but the deceased was held to have been maintaining her before his death such that she could claim as a dependant. qualifying factor in both jurisdictions before making a case for the recognition of a broader range of relationships.
A. Approaches to Definition

Ireland
Under the Irish 2010 Act, a "cohabitant" is defined by section 172 as "one of [two] adults (whether of the same or the opposite sex) who live together as a couple in an intimate and committed relationship". 74 The cohabitants must not have been married to, or in a civil partnership with, each other, 75 and they must have been outside of the prohibited degrees in relation to each other. 76 In determining whether a couple satisfy the definition of "cohabitant", the court is instructed to consider "all the circumstances of the relationship", but with "particular" regard to a number of factors. 77 These are contained in section 172(2) of the 2010 Act, and they effectively serve as a checklist. This approach is followed in several Commonwealth jurisdictions, 78 and indeed the Law Reform Commission expressly cited the relevant New South Wales legislation when setting out its proposed list.
79
The relevant considerations in the 2010 Act are the relationship's duration, 80 the "basis on financial arrangements", expressed to include the joint purchase of property, 83 whether there are any dependent children 84 and whether one party cares for the children of the other, 85 and "the degree to which the adults present themselves to others as a couple".
86
The Irish Law Reform Commission's Draft Cohabitants Bill contained the proviso that:
No finding in respect of any of the matters mentioned in [the equivalent provision to section 172(2)], or in respect of any combination of them, is to be regarded as necessary for the purpose of determining that two adults are cohabitants; and in determining whether they are cohabitants, regard may be had to those matters, and to attach such weight to those matters, as is appropriate in the circumstances. This could have significant consequences when the Act comes to be interpreted by the judiciary if the absence of such a provision reinforces the notion that some factors must necessarily be present before the parties to a relationship are deemed to be "cohabitants".
The succession-related reforms in the Act do not apply even to all those who do satisfy its definition of "cohabitant". It therefore further defines the "qualified cohabitant" by setting down minimum durations for which he and his partner must have lived as a couple. 90 The relevant duration is two years where the cohabitants are both the parents of at least one dependent child, children are present and the redistribution of property inter vivos raises difficult issues in shorter relationships, five years is an excessive period before which a cohabitant can even be eligible to seek provision from an estate of which his deceased partner has no subsisting need.
The Act also takes a conservative approach to cohabiting parties with subsisting marriages to third parties. Whatever the duration of the relationship, if either party to the relationship was married to (but apparently not in a civil partnership with) someone else, neither cohabitant will be "qualified" unless each married party lived apart from his spouse for at least four in the previous five years. 97 This restriction was not proposed in the Law Reform Commission's Draft Bill. 98 It eventually 99 took the view that while the entitlements of a current or former spouse of a cohabitant should be taken into account and notice of the proceedings should be given to such a person, "an existing marriage should not be a bar to an application under the proposed redress model". 
England and Wales
English Responsibilities towards children were not at issue in the particular case of Churchill, but they are also likely to be given significant weight in English Law.
121
Despite these different methods of defining the relevant relationship, it therefore seems that the two pieces of legislation will cover similar sorts of association, although the differences in the Inevitably, however, the model contained in the 2010 Act does present the difficult task of prioritising a diverse range of considerations, and the English Law Commission has expressed concern about the possibility that such a list could introduce a "box-ticking mentality". 124 Overall, the checklist approach does at least provide substantive and explicit guidance on the nature of the relationship that is the subject of regulation, and is advantageous provided a flexible approach is adopted by the judiciary and no factor is considered necessary or sufficient without strong because it is no longer sexual in nature". There is therefore a clear assumption that two "cohabitants" will have engaged in sexual activity at some point over the course of the relationship.
That assumption is reinforced by the exclusion of those within the prohibited degrees of relationship from the definition of "cohabitant", and from the absence of any proviso that no one factor is to be regarded as necessary for the purposes of establishing the existence of a relevant cohabitation relationship. The Act also makes reference to the public nature of coupledom by including "the degree to which the adults present themselves to others as a couple" among the checklist factors. 
England and Wales
English family provision law appears to make similar assumptions about sexual intimacy forming part of the essence of coupledom. While the prohibited degrees of relationship 134 are not specifically referenced in the definition of the relevant relationship, it is extremely unlikely that the judiciary would hold that two people within the prohibited degrees could be "living…as" spouses or civil partners. 135 In Re Watson (Deceased), 136 it was held that an elderly couple who shared neither a bedroom nor a sexual relationship while they lived together did in fact satisfy the requirements of section 1(1A) of the 1975 Act. Neuberger J. noted that the couple had shared a common domestic life for over a decade. On the other hand, the judge was apparently influenced by the fact that they had enjoyed a sexual relationship at an earlier stage in their lives, albeit before they lived together, and that they had been prevented from setting up home together at that point due to obligations owed towards their respective parents. Neuberger J. also rejected the suggestion that it was sufficient to show that the deceased and the applicant had a relationship that could potentially be enjoyed by a husband and wife. for the deceased, the less likely it is that his claim will succeed. 147 This is because the "full valuable consideration" that the applicant must avoid providing for the maintenance has been interpreted as including benefits conferred otherwise than under a contract, such that the contributions of the claimant and the deceased must be balanced. 148 In Plumley v. Bishop, however, Butler-Sloss L.J.
considered it important to avoid "fine balancing computations involving the value of normal exchanges of support in the domestic sense". 149 Building on this, the English Law Commission has recommended an approach based on factual dependency on the relationship itself rather than on a "flow of benefits" from the deceased to the applicant. 150 This suggestion should be welcomed, since it avoids the difficult question of which party is truly dependent on the other. 151 Moreover, where a provider of a domestic or other service has been promised testamentary provision by the deceased, the doctrine of proprietary estoppel may be able to provide a remedy irrespective of (and perhaps strengthened by) 152 the lack of a familial or conjugal relationship with the deceased. 153 But for the moment, albeit to a lesser extent than for its Irish equivalent, a sexual relationship remains a key feature of eligibility under the 1975 Act where the applicant was not related by blood or marriage/civil partnership 154 to the deceased.
C. The Case for Greater Inclusion
Lessons from Australia
The focus on conjugal couples (who are publically recognised as such) present in both English and by one conjugal cohabitant to another, such as one to the effect that "she did not need to worry her pretty little head about money", were "to be contrasted with statements made to unpaid or underpaid workers or business partners, encouraged to work on because they would be 'treated right', and for whom a commensurate reward could be objectively assessed" (at [18]).
Wales in 1999. 157 The concept of a "domestic relationship" includes not only a de facto (conjugal) relationship 158 but also a "close personal relationship". 159 The recognition of the "close personal relationship" sought to provide "an avenue for redress for people who suffer some detriment (and are not compensated for it) because of the care and support they provide to another, be it an elderly or ailing parent or friend or neighbour, for no fee or reward". subsisted at the time of death 163 and "having regard to all the circumstances of the case (whether past or present) there are factors which warrant the making of the application".
164
The requirement of subsistence at the time of death for a "close personal relationship" is more restrictive than the Irish criteria for a "qualifying cohabitant" and the "living together" requirement imposes an additional hurdle as compared to the English "dependants" category (albeit that the English category is restrictive in other respects). 165 But the New South Wales Court of Appeal has suggested that the common residence requirement might be "somewhat more 
Policy Arguments
The Australian models considered above demonstrate that it is at least possible to allow succession claims by parties to relationships primarily characterised by domestic support rather than blood, marital, or conjugal ties. This section attempts to address some of the policy arguments against the inclusion of such applicants (or applicants whose lives are otherwise intertwined except by virtue of a sexual relationship) within or alongside the couple-based provisions of the 1975 and 2010 Acts.
It has been said that " [t] here is very little research in Ireland or elsewhere on non-conjugal relationships". 177 But any uncertainty surrounding the level of need for recognition of non-conjugal relationships should not be allowed to detract from the problems of principle with focusing on sexual intimacy (whether or not it produces children) as a necessary factor triggering inclusion, as distinct from a factor affecting the success of a given claim. Indeed, several scholars have questioned the relevance of sexual intimacy to relationship recognition. 178 For example, Wong has argued that there is "no logical reason to limit access to the law to only couple-based relationships" in a conjugal sense. 179 Baroness Deech has emphasised that "sexual activity itself does not cause dependency", 180 and Choudhry and Herring note that two people who live together and have a sexual relationship do not per se "provide any particular benefit to the rest of society". 181 By contrast, those who provide domestic and other support to each other, without necessarily being in a conjugal relationship, do provide a benefit to society and each other. 182 Indeed, Fineman considers society to be dependent on the "caretaking labor" 183 of "derivative dependants", i.e. those who assume or are assigned responsibility for the care of someone who is inevitably dependent on others. 184 She criticises the fact that most of the costs of care are borne by the people providing the care themselves rather than being distributed amongst the true beneficiaries of care, whether institutional or individual. Fineman's writings have been said to require a recognition of "desert" in allocating resources. 185 Citing Fineman's work, Choudhry and
Herring discuss an "alternative vision" based on a "carer-dependant" paradigm, albeit admitting that it would produce "a very different kind of family law". 186 Whether the relevant relationship is properly characterised as "dependent" or "interdependent", 187 and whatever precise factors may justify its recognition or non-recognition, many legal systems reflect a reluctance to move "beyond conjugality" 188 as far as such recognition is concerned. 189 Fineman has warned of the dangers of Borkowski has noted that English testators were substantially unencumbered for only about a century. 202 It is clear as a matter of logic that a deceased person no longer has any substantial need of his property, and this contrasts sharply with the situation where property is divided inter vivos.
Peart has acknowledged that "the preservation and security of the family" is one of the purposes of succession law, 203 and it could be said that a broad understanding of "family" should be permitted for this purpose. 204 A testamentary claim need not require the "breakdown" of a relationship, with all its conjugal connotations, and such a claim is more likely to reflect the intention of the parries than where a relationship has broken down inter vivos and a remedy is sought. 205 Eekelaar is also more willing to contemplate a succession claim than an inter vivos one in the context of an altruistic Of course, the fact that the two pieces of legislation produce similar results does not mean that those results are correct. This article has suggested that both place a significant and undue amount of weight on the presence or absence of sexual intimacy, even if the English Act counterbalances this to some extent with a "dependants" category that could soon be the subject of further reform. Whatever the uncertainties and empirical background, there are other relationships worthy of protection via succession law whose parties are less likely to fall within the relevant definitions of "cohabitant" under either Act, and it is not clear why a sexual relationship should be a pre-requisite for eligibility (even if it ultimately becomes relevant when a given claim is evaluated).
Both England and Wales and Ireland should follow the lead taken by the Australian states and territories in recognising a wider range of non-conjugal relationships in their family provision laws.
It is particularly disappointing that Ireland failed to do so given that reforms to its succession law were undertaken so recently. Until it facilitates a wider range of family provision claims, the Irish state could be accused of taking an unhealthily strong interest in the sex lives (or lack thereof) of its citizens via the succession provisions of the 2010 Act.
